01-10-25, 07:35 PM
We weren't going to do this. Today we planned to publish something else, but... we're going back to Ceibal as a form of punishment for Plan Ceibal's cybersecurity staff. The Uruguayan government is accustomed to lying to ordinary citizens who don't know about technology when it comes to data leaks. Hackers in forums are used to saying nothing against this, and we were part of this rule until now... The lie is so big and the defense so pathetic that they force us to act... We warned the Plan Ceibal staff with an email, but we did not get a response, so here we are...
![[Image: tevoyaextra-ar.png]](https://i.ibb.co/5hKff0kc/tevoyaextra-ar.png)
Details of the Data breach: Full name, cedula de identidad, ID, Email address, user_type, course_administration, group_administrator, educational institution, user_courses, user_groups, user_achievements, privacy, subjects_taught, levels_taught, job_title, biography account, birthday, Phone number, activities, interests, website url
citizens in sample database: 42k
Screenshot of the sample with 42k Uruguayan citizens from the Plan Ceibal database:
![[Image: masoneschupavergas.png]](https://i.ibb.co/6cGD6B2M/masoneschupavergas.png)
Ceibal claims that we did not access its internal network... Ceibal claims that only one CREA user was affected... Ceibal claims that there was no data leak... Our sincere question is... why deny all of that? The logical answer is to avoid looking bad in public and to appease society with a false statement... My second logical answer is that Ceibal's cybersecurity staff are so stupid that they seriously think we did not access the internal network... since as we write this and after the news in El Observador, El Pais, LaDiaria, and other media outlets, WE STILL HAVE ACCESS TO THE INTERNAL NETWORK. They suspended our privileged access to CREA, but not to their internal network. Here are the screenshots from the internal employee network:
![[Image: metratongeometriasagradasigueelcamino.png]](https://i.ibb.co/Mxh7GtBq/metratongeometriasagradasigueelcamino.png)
A few hours ago, we made a video in which we accessed Ceibal's internal employee network and searched for Yamandu Orsi's two children in the assigned devices section. We also made a video using the cyber intelligence service in Uruguayan databases to find the relatives of the president of Uruguay and remotely reset the password for the CREA platform user account of one of the president's children, leaving a message for the Ministry of the Interior and Ceibal staff in the account description. ( All of this was done after Ceibal stated that, according to the “analysis of the technical teams,” no one had accessed its internal employee network. )
Download links to obtain the database with 42k CREA users (this is the sample), in total there are 1.2M
https://limewire.com/d/eagmq#pWuZ4nWehJhttps://limewire.com/d/HFzJs#ajnonxGZSd
http://g6zlf5jkbpbaomlwx5zgq6fhl2yyetvnn...sample.txt (Tor)
http://g6zlf5jkbpbaomlwx5zgq6fhl2yyetvnn...sample.txt (Tor)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
contact: @lapampaleaksbf (telegram) - our service website (clear web) - our website on the Tor network
